From globalization to deglobalization: Zooming into trade. Bruegel Special Report by Herrero, Alicia Garcia
33
LAS CLAVES DE LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 4.0
1.  Globalization as cornerstone of international 
economics turning the page
As probably the most prominent economic process 
in the 21st century, globalization has attracted wide 
research interests and considerable support from ac-
ademia for many decades, especially after the Second 
World War. There are many benefits which economic 
research has attributed to globalization, from higher 
economic growth to poverty reduction and even lower 
inflation. For instance, Khan & Riskin (2001) finds 
that China’s poverty reduction can be attributed to 
the opening up of its economy. What’s more, Rogoff 
(2003) argues that the globalization process helps push 
down inflation and any reversal of the free flow of pro-
duction factors will re-introduce price pressure. In ad-
dition, Tomohara and Taki (2011) put forward that 
globalization brings higher wages for local employers 
as foreign companies are given market access.
However, the economic literature on globalization has 
taken a less positive turn since 2008. Hillebrand (2010), 
for example, argues that protectionism may improve in-
come equality in some countries although he still thinks 
that a retreat from globalization will lead to profoundly 
negative implications to the global economy.
On the basis of the increasingly heated debate on 
where we stand with globalization versus deglobaliza-
tion and its importance for the global economy, this 
paper aims at shedding some light on the trend and 
current degree of deglobalization focusing on trade.
There seems to be enough evidence by now to ar-
gue that the globalization process, including the free 
flow of trade, capital and people, has stalled since the 
global financial crisis in 2008. Regarding the move-
ment of merchandise, after a sharp decline in 2008, 
the general expectation was that trade would contin-
ue to grow at rates similar to those previous to the 
crisis. Actually, this has not been the case. Chart 1 
shows that trade volume grew by an average of 3.5% 
from 2009 to 2018, which is much slower than the 
7.6% average growth before the 2008 financial Cri-
sis. Furthermore, we are now at a zero growth rate 
in trade, which is understandable on the back of the 
US-China trade war and several other protectionist 
waves, such as the US with Europe but also between 
Japan and Korea.
In line with the deceleration in trade, cross-border 
capital flows have also declined. This is true general-
ly but also for the most stable (and possibly produc-
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tive) type of capital flow, namely foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), which has declined sharply to the level 
of 2008 (chart 2). In fact, the average growth rate of 
outward FDI since 2000 points to a minimal 0.8%, 
with a decline of -28% in 2018 owing to escalating 
trade tensions. It is hard to know whether FDI is no 
longer growing because of lack of demand or because 
of constraints for investors to operate. In any event, 
the difference in returns among recipient countries 
are such that the much lower FDI nowadays could be 
seen as a critical sign of fragmentation of global capital 
markets. As if FDI trends were not enough, portfolio 
flows into emerging economies have also slowed down 
since the European Sovereign Crisis in 2010 (chart 3). 
The exception has been Emerging Asia until 2017 but 
portfolio inflows into Asia have started to come down 
too since 2017(chart 4). The picture for cross-border 
lending is more mixed. Total cross-border lending has 
not come back to the levels before 2008 but there is 
a shift towards more lending into Emerging Markets 
and less into developed economies (chart 5).
As people-to-people movement, either in terms of 
migration or tourism, globalization is still on the go. 
In fact, the number of international migrant has been 
rising, suggesting movements of labor remains active-
ly increasing (chart 6). The relatively more short-term 
visitors’ arrival data also confirms the pattern with a 
steady growth rate of 4% (chart 7). However, we start 
to see some signs of increasing restrictions. As shown 
in chart 6 & 7, both migrant and visitor numbers in 
the world is experiencing slower growth. What’s more, 
featuring many anti-immigration movements, immi-
gration controls have been significantly tightened es-
pecially in the US with a rapid increase in visa denials 
(chart 8). This is an obvious barrier for further integra-
tion of the labor market globally, given the importance 
of the US labor market.
Chart 1
Global trade in volume
% YoY
Source: UNCTAD, Bloomberg, Natixis.
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Chart 2
World outward FDI flow
Source: UNCTAD, Natixis.
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Chart 3
Total Portfolio Flows into Emerging Markets
USD bn
Source: IIF, Natixis.
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Chart 4
Total Portfolio Flows into Emerging Markets by region
USD bn
Source: IIF, Natixis.
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Chart 5
Global banking flow
USD bn
Source: BIS, Natixis.
(*) EM gauged based on available data, including Brazil, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, South Korea, Macao, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, 
Singapore, Turkey and South Africa.
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Chart 6
International migrant stock
Source: UN, Natixis.
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Chart 7
International tourist arrival
Billion
Source: UNWTO, Natixis.
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The question, thus, is how have we gotten here and 
what to expect next. One key aspect is the increasingly 
hostile relation between the two largest economies in 
the world, namely the US and China. Analyzing the 
reasons for this and its future consequences can offer 
some cues as to the potential for additional deglobali-
zation forces. The next section reviews the trade as-
pects of the US-China strategic competition, followed 
by a section on other economic aspects as well as a brief 
account of the implications of the ongoing US-China 
trade war on the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and, thereby, to the further deglobalization of trade.
2.  The US-China trade war
To understand the trade war and its implications, a 
good starting point is to review the actions taken by 
both sides so far. From seemingly untargeted meas-
ures announced in early February 2018 for solar pan-
els and washing machines, the US has been moving 
in increasingly targeted direction against China and 
away from current global status quo. The most ob-
vious instance of this was the announcement of 25 
percent additional import duties to be applied to $50 
billion equivalents of imported goods from China 
on the basis of China’s infringement of intellectual 
property rights. More importantly, about two thirds 
of those import tariffs have been applied since 6 July 
2018. The speedy introduction of the announced 
import tariffs by the US, without allowing much 
time for negotiation of a deal between China and the 
US, shows that the US resolution to change global 
trade flows, at least as far as China is concerned. On 
that basis, China had no choice but to retaliate with 
equivalent import tariffs on US goods.
Since then, the list of Chinese imports on which the 
US is aiming to increase tariffs has expanded to cover 
an additional $200 billion of goods. Thanks to a truce 
reached on the side-lines of the Buenos Aires G20 
summit in late 2018, the 25 percent US import tariff 
on an additional $200 billion of goods from China 
was postponed, but it is clear that this was just a truce 
to buy time for both sides.
Chart 8
Increasing visa refusal rate for tourist and business travelers from major economies by US
(%)
Source: US Department of State, Natixis.
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China’s ability to retaliate against US trade measures 
has obviously been more limited, at least on the trade 
side, because it does not import enough goods from 
the US to match the US import tariffs. This explains 
why China’s second batch of retaliatory measures was 
more moderate, at least in size ($60 billion). Un-
fortunately, the peace did not sustain as the turning 
point came in March 2019 when the US raised tariff 
to 25 percent from 10 percent on the $200 billion 
Chinese imports. Ever since then, the market has seen 
no shortage of hostility such as US’s move to place 
Huawei into its entity list in May, banning it from 
purchasing from US companies and China retaliation 
to increase tariff on $60 billion worth of product at 
25, 20 and 10 percent respectively in June. Between 
periods of tension escalation is tentative cooling-off 
phases, as President Xi and President Trump repeat-
edly rekindled trade talks before major meetings but 
subsequently let the market down all of a sudden. The 
tale of the two went on until almost full tariff coverage 
of Chinese imports was placed and made pending by 
President Trump on August 13 followed by declaring 
China as a currency manipulator. The confrontation 
went on as China retaliated with tariff on USD 75 
billion worth of US goods on August 23rd and lodged 
a WTO tariff case against the US on September 2, 
2019. Soon however, China and US agreed to 13th 
Chart 9
A comparison of the US-China targeted products released in June and July
(%)
Source: Natixis, USITC, UN Comtrade.
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Chart 10
Decomposition of US’ imports from China
under the 200 billion tariff list
Source: Natixis, USITC.
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round of trade talks on September 5th and China 
unveils tariff exemption list for US imports on Sep-
tember 11th, 2019, suggesting a new cooling off pe-
riod is on the doorstep. As rounds of escalation and 
de-escalation of trade tension took place, the market 
seems to gradually adapt to a new norm of hospitali-
ty between the two world superpowers. These tariffs 
and complaints feature the severe confrontation be-
tween US and China. Rounds of conflicts and mak-
ing up seem to be the main theme since early 2018, 
rapturing global supply chain over and over again.
Arguably, the Sino-US trade war has been a land-
mark event for deglobalization forces in the realm of 
trade. In fact, global trade has seen declining since 
2018 both in value and volume and thee have been 
relevant disruptions of the global supply chain. The 
ensuing economic uncertainty has put downward 
pressure on investment, which has led the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund in its July World Econom-
ic Outlook to downgrade the forecast for global 
growth, but especially for China and Asia (chart 
11). Overall, rounds of de-escalation and re-esca-
lation of the US-China trade war have significantly 
raised the risk of protectionism, weighing on mar-
ket sentiment and deteriorating global risk appetite. 
What’s more, in response to heightened geopolitical 
risk in China and Asia (as expanding sanctions are 
threatened by the US to be imposed on Vietnam), 
massive reshoring away from China, and possibly 
Asia are taking place. This trend is going to signif-
icantly distort global trade and capital flows, push-
ing the global economy further towards the trend of 
deglobalization.
Apart from the above, following the path of the US, 
other countries are leveraging protectionism and 
trade as weapons to achieve unilateral benefits. For 
example, Japan’s recently tightened its export con-
trols on South Korean imports from Japan. Also the 
US has opened a number of cases against European 
exports into the US and has even threatened to ex-
pand those tariffs to much more relevant sectors, 
such as the European automobile industry. More 
generally, the fear exists that other countries may 
engage in further protectionist measures, introduc-
ing a race to the bottom.
Chart 11
Asia growth slowed across the board
Sources: Natixis, Datastream.
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3. From tariffs to other types of protectionism
Apart from trade measures, the US has leveraged sev-
eral other weapons against China. Most notably, on 
December 1, 2018 the arrest of Huawei’s chief finan-
cial officer took place in Canada at the US request, 
based on a potential breach of sanctions against Iran. 
This case testifies the US’ intention to weaponize its 
current hegemonic position as a rule setter. As the 
national champion in China’s telecommunication 
sector, Huawei has attracted multiple restrictions on 
top of the arrest. For instance, the US has tightened 
its control over technology transfer into China and, in 
particular Huawei, by placing this company into the 
US entity list, which effectively forbids US companies 
to conduct business with this company. In addition, 
many countries have voiced out concerns of privacy 
and Chinese spy suspicion for the 5G & smartphone 
manufacturer to harness its growth and the outlook of 
China’s Information and communications technology 
development. As such, the sniped Huawei symbol-
ize the deterred process of technology globalization, 
which will in turn drive fragmentation of investment, 
manufacturing and employment.
Beyond Huawei, the US administration has conducted 
a reform of its Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States Committee (CFIUS), with the view 
of making it easier to blocking an increasing amount 
of China’s M&A into US, especially on the high-end 
industrial sector. Technology protectionism is actually 
going beyond the US into other developed countries, 
especially the European Union, which has finally set 
up its own investment screening device las April.
Beyond tech protectionism, there seems to be an 
embryonic move towards financial decoupling due 
to geopolitical trends. In fact, several Chinese com-
panies including SMIC and Alibaba have announced 
the voluntarily delisting from US stock exchanges. 
However, concerns have been raised whether such 
voluntary delisting may lead to less access to USD is-
suance and in return shortage of USD liquidity, given 
the dominance of the US financial system in sourcing 
greenback financing. In response, China has adopted 
policies to encourage the funding for tech compa-
nies including the launch of SSE STAR Market and 
loosening regulations for financing. Such potential 
financial decoupling deepens concerns over the trend 
of deglobalization.
4.  The demise of the WTO and its implications
The WTO has become increasingly dysfunctional dur-
ing the last few years and, in particular, since the ar-
rival of President Trump to power. Three main reasons 
can be identified. First, the increase in membership 
has brought about heterogeneity as more emerging 
countries joined the club. This is clearly shown by the 
lack of agreement on concluding the Doha round of 
trade liberalisation measures, which launched in 2001. 
Second, some new members, especially China but also 
Vietnam, are still state-led planned economies, a mod-
el the WTO rules have not been designed for. Third, 
under the Trump administration, the United States has 
clearly turned its back on the WTO as an institution 
that can solve the US’s perceived trade problems. A 
further decision by President Trump that unsettled the 
global trading community in 2018 was the announce-
ment that (continuing a policy initiated by President 
Obama) the US would block reappointments to the 
WTO’s appeals panel, on the grounds that the appel-
late body took too long to reach decisions and tended 
to overreach. At the time of writing, the appellate body 
is down to only three members (out of seven) of which 
two will end their terms in December 2019. If the 
US administration continues to refuse new appoint-
ments, the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism will 
no longer be able to function. This threat comes two 
sides: President Trump’s profound disdain for multi-
lateralism, and China’s state-led system, which is not 
compatible with the liberal nature of the global trad-
ing system and might have weakened the WTO’s foun-
dations. China has influenced the WTO’s rule setting, 
which is intended to ensure a level playing field. In 
fact, it has become increasingly clear that the existing 
rules governing the WTO cannot adequately control 
the use of non-market measures designed to favour a 
specific trading partner (namely China) over others. 
To this end, several proposals have been made to re-
form of the WTO, including from the European Un-
ion, but none of them can really accommodate both 
China and the US under the same umbrella. The most 
42
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likely scenario is for the WTO to become a zombie 
institution as the US disengages further. Should this 
scenario materialize, the pale international negotia-
tion mechanism will become incapable of mediating 
international trade disputes and building multilateral 
trust, driving economies to seek their own leverages 
and solutions.
5.  Some tentative conclusions
After decades of increasing globalization both in trade, 
capital flows but even people to people movements, it 
seems the trend has turned towards deglobalization. 
This article shows some evidence of the decrease in 
merchandise, capital and, to a lesser extent people to 
people flows. In addition, zooming into trade, the arti-
cle offers an account of the importance of the strategic 
competition between the US and China to foster the 
deglobalization trend further. This is true for trade but 
even beyond in the tech and finance space. Finally, the 
demise of the WTO could be one of the most relevant 
turning points towards deglobalization, especially as 
far as trade is concerned. This should bring downward 
pressure to growth globally.
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